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Abstract
The air transport sector entered the European Trading Scheme in 2012
(for the intra-European flights). The regulation of CO2 emissions is costly for
airlines and modifies the organization of their market. Our paper proposes an
economic analysis in which the regulation but also CO2 emissions of airlines
are modeled. We show that, in a perfect competition setting, the difference
between passengers carried without regulation and when the regulation is
considered is negative for the best-performing planes. However, for the less
efficient aircraft, the implementation of the regulation entails a reduction of
airlines activity, and therefore a low level of carbon emissions.
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1 Introduction
Since the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, several governments have made significant progress
toward improving air quality. In this sense, the air transport sector in Europe will
be fully included in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), in
2012. Despite the relatively low level of greenhouse gas emissions (only 3% of the
total European emissions), this sector has known a rapid growth until recently:
from 1990 to 2005, the EU aviation emissions increased by 87% and it is expected
to double from now to 2020 (See Commission Staff working document 2006 and EU
directive 2003/87/EC). On top of this, the air transport sector is also responsible for
other releases like nitrogen oxides, water vapor or noise, which effects are not easy
to account. Nevertheless, a regulation of these external effects is to be expected. It
is thus important to evaluate which impacts a regulation may have on the market
and its organization.
The environmental literature defines pollution as an externality which is not
taken into account by the market. Several instruments have been put forward (tax-
ation, subsidies, norms or allowances trading) resulting in State intervention, and
the literature deeply analyzes the efficiency of these different tools (see for instance
Myles, 1995 or Salanie´, 2003). Our work builds on this general literature focusing on
the specificities of the air transport sector to model the impact of an environmental
regulation. The environment problems have raised several questions. For instance,
Portney (2005) makes a review of the existing regulations and tries to evaluate what
will be the regulations of the future. Among the economic tools used to regulate,
the taxation is the means which has the most received attention. Barthold (1994)
presents the different taxes used for environmental regulation and their efficiency to
regulate emissions.
The European Commission has included the aviation sector in the EU-ETS in
2012 in relation to the airlines’ carbon emissions. The aim of carbon markets is
to provide incentives to reduce CO2 emissions. The environmental problems have
raised several questions. Scheelhaase and Grimme (2007) focus on financial impacts
to include aviation in the ETS on airlines. They show that the financial impact on
airlines subject to the ETS is relatively moderate. Since the regulation concerns all
flights departing from and arriving at EU airports, Scheelhaase and al. (2010), under
a model-based empirical estimations, analyze how the EU directive affects competi-
tion between european and non-european airlines and if competition distortions are
likely to appear. They compute fuel consumption, CO2 emissions and number of
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allowances to know the difference between allowances allocated free of charge and
the total amount of them needed by the airlines (with a price assumed to e20 per
ton of CO2 and two scenarios considered for emissions growth). Moreover, regarding
consumers’ surplus, they show that the impact on prices is relatively moderate.
On an macro-economic view, Anger (2010) shows that there is not expected to
have a negative impact of the EU-ETS on economic growth in the UE or to reduce
the UE’s competitiveness relative to the rest of the world. However concerning the
impact of EU-ETS on the carbon emissions, the results are ambiguous. Mayor and
Tol (2007) find a negative impact on the carbon emissions whereas Anger (2010)
concludes in a positive way. It seem difficult to have an economic model which
combine the regulation of EU-ETS, the financial impact on airlines and the level of
carbon emissions.
In this sense, we built an economic model which offers a precise framework of
nonetheless the regulation but also of emissions of airlines. The regulation system
includes two different elements: the first element concerns free allowances that will
be given to airlines according to their current activity. The second element is the
payment of rights to pollute on the CO2 market. There is a strategic stake in the
setting of the ”free of charge” quotas, since their number depends on the activity
of the airlines: with this system, the airlines will receive a number of rights to
pollute proportional to their activity. On the other hand, the rights to pollute, i.e.
the internalization of the pollution, will represent an additional cost, which will be
higher, the higher the activity. As a consequence we have paid very much attention
to the modelization both of the regulation and of the production of emissions. We
model the emissions as a joint product of the airlines activity that comes from the use
of the fuel. Models of joint production are presented for instance by Baumgartner
et al. (2000, 2003). Hence a particular attention is given to the estimation of
the fuel cost function, which is calibrated using real data. We chose to model the
EU-ETS as an increase of the variable cost, which means that it can be similar
to a tax (or a subsidy) on the airline activity, because the regulation is designed
as such. A particular attention is given to the study of the use of the fuel by
airlines because of its direct relationship with CO2 emissions (See the IPCC report
1999 for an evaluation of the impact of aviation on global atmosphere and the
EU Directive 2007/589/EC for the determination of a precise coefficient linking fuel
consumption and CO2 emissions). Harris (2005) makes an exhaustive analysis of the
US airlines operational costs. Miyoshi and Mason (2009) focus on the evaluation of
the carbon emissions of airlines. They propose an original methodology to compute
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these emissions. They distinguish between short, medium and long hauls and they
take into account the load factor, however in our paper we model it. Therefore,
we use our method to evaluate the emission,1 but the contribution of our paper
is more on the economic modelling of the EU-ETS consequences on airlines and
therefore on their strategies. Our paper is also directly related to papers such as
Viera et al. (2007), in which the authors emphasized the importance of having
several instruments to reach efficient result. By focusing on the current regulation
and trying to describe it as close as possible from the reality, we propose a more
positive view. Hofer et al. (2009) try to reach the same aim with the taxation in
the US, however no economic model is presented in their paper. Finally, our model
is the extension of the paper of Albers et al. (2009) and Anger and Kholer (2010)
which try to evaluate the impact of the EU-ETS on airlines. Again, no economic
model is presented in this literature.
We will focus on the regulation of CO2 in EU and try to model it as faithful
to reality as possible, the following section presents the system of European Union
Emissions Trading Scheme. In section 3, we introduce a modelisation of the EU-
ETS system and we show stylised facts on some financial consequences for airlines.
This section ends with the equilibrium of the economic model in which we derive the
results and give interpretations. The final section presents some concluding remarks.
2 On CO2 emission trading scheme in EU
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), created in 2003 (EC,
2003) and implemented in 2005, is the first international trading system for carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions in the world. The aim of carbon markets is to provide incen-
tives to reduce CO2 emissions. This system was implementable between european
countries under several measures. Allocation is a unique feature of cap-and-trade
systems. Indeed, a critical issue in dealing with climate change is deciding who has
a right to emit carbon dioxide (CO2), under what conditions, and to what extent
those emissions are limited. The EU-ETS is the first instance of creating explicit
rights to emit CO2 and distributing these rights among sub-national entities. One
of the main measures in the EU-ETS is to provide free allowances. The cap for
these free allowances in the aviation sector will be limited to 97% of an annual rate
of reference from 2012 and this limit will be restricted to 95% from the period 2013
1See in appendix A.
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to 2020.
Moreover, the system was able to take advantage of the experience of the United
States in the field of the acid rains. The US’s success with sulphur dioxide emissions
trading provides to European economists insights to apply to the European situation
and provides to, in the Member States and the Commission, a body of literature
and individual experiences to learn from. The EU-ETS program was divided into
two phases, a pilot phase (2005-07) and a second or “Kyoto” phase (2008-12) to
ensure a quality program.
The allocation methodologies applied by the 25/27 participating nations were
remarkably similar. Four choices seem particularly interesting:
- Auctioning was only little used. One of the most striking features in the EU
allocation process was that most Member States chose not to take advantage of the
Directive’s provision allowing states to auction up to 5% of allowances in Phase I
and 10% in Phase II.
- Strong reliance on recent historical emissions. The disparity between advo-
cacy and practice was in no aspect greater than for benchmarking. Benchmarking
was strongly advocated however little used, which is a striking difference from US
practice.
- Expected shortage was allocated to the power sector. Another distinctive fea-
ture in the EU allocation process was that the power sector was compelled to bear
almost the entirety of the emissions reduction burden. When a Member state was
short on allowances, this shortage was almost entirely allocated to the power sector.
- Highly novel new entrant/closure provisions. All Member States have set up
reserves for new entrants, and most require closed facilities to forfeit post-closure
allowances, even though there are significant differences between the specific Member
State choices.
The first lessons of the pilot phase are that the European Commission has harmo-
nized allocation rules across Member States and has tightened the carbon constraint
in Phase II. Moreover, free allocation does not necessarily lead to “windfall profits”
and first studies, as presented in the next section, show that the increase of costs
due to CO2 regulation affect consumers’ price but firms do not put the total cost on
prices. Finally, new entrant/closure provisions provided perverse incentives. Indeed,
the main effect of these provisions was to preserve pre-policy incentives to invest in
polluting technology.
Concerning the quantity of allowances exchanged, these quantities in 2005 was
relatively low at 262 Mt. Trades increased nearly fourfold by 2006, when 809 Mt
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were exchanged. The maturation of the market was confirmed in 2007, when almost
1 500 Mt were traded. These transactions are made with an average price of e22
per tonne in 2005, therefore the allowance transactions totaled e5.97 billion during
the year. This total increased to e15.2 billion in 2006 before reaching e24.1 billion
in 2007.
Once quantities exchanged are estimated, the EU allowance (EUA) price can
be fixed. This price is determined by the equilibrium between supply and demand.
Between the phase I and II, EUA price tends to decrease nearly to zero due to surplus
saved on the period 2005-2007. Phase I allowance prices’ fell under 1 e/tCO2 in
February 2007 and ended 2007 at 0.02 et/CO2. Finally, The EUA prices for 2008-
2012 remain stable and reach a peak at e25.
Therefore, the collapse of the first period carbon price has not jeopardized the
expansion of the trading scheme. This is probably one of the most impressive results
of this first trial period: all the big industrial and financial partners now accept that
carbon is no longer free in Europe and that the carbon emissions will continue to
be costly in the future.
Finally, concerning the level of carbon emissions, we can conclude that a modest
amount of abatement occurred in 2005-2006. In a preliminary but detailed analysis
of this data, Ellerman and Buchner (2010) concluded that a reasonable estimate of
the reduction in CO2 emissions attributable to the EU-ETS lies between 50 and 100
Mt for each year, or between 2.5% and 5% from what emissions would have been
without the EU-ETS.
The EU-ETS system is the first carbon market and is now implementable in
the aviation sector. To know how is the impact of this regulation on the airlines,
consumers’ surplus or CO2 emission, we present the economic model.
3 Model Settings
3.1 The Emission Trading Scheme regulation
Airlines are responsible for externalities such as pollution (NOx, CO2, noise...) con-
gestion and accidents. These externalities have social costs which differ from indi-
vidual costs. For instance, the air transport sector produces CO2 emissions while
the Society would prefer a lower level of these emissions. The levels of production
of CO2 differ because the air transport sector is producing CO2 at a zero cost while
the Society values negatively the emissions of CO2. The Society would be willing to
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pay to reduce the level of CO2 emissions. The problem is that the market failed to
take into account the social costs and finally, a public intervention is needed because
the right level of production is not reached. The economic literature suggests differ-
ent instruments like norms or emission quotas (regulation in quantity) or taxes or
subsidies (regulation in prices) to consider social costs (as pollution). The European
Commission has chosen to create a market for pollution in order to make firms buy
the rights to pollute. This market for allowances is thus used to regulate the CO2
emissions. The principle is simple: The regulator sets a maximum quantity of CO2
emissions tolerated by the Society for a given period (generally a year) and firms
exchange rights to pollute. On this market, there will be firms from different sectors,
sectors which pollute and thus have to buy for their emissions and sectors which
receive rights because they pollute less than what they are entitled to emit. Air-
lines will be included in the European cap-and-trade system starting 2012.2 They
thus will have to pay for their CO2 emissions and follow a certain path in terms of
reduction of their CO2 emissions. The principle of the regulation is to give part of
the total emissions of a given airline for free and to let it buy on a market the rights
to pollute for the other part of its emissions. As it is costly, one expects airlines
to take measures to reduce their emissions. 85% of the allowances will be given for
free. The EU defined a benchmark of emissions which corresponds to the average of
the emissions calculated for the period 2004 to 2006. The target of the regulation
is then to reduce the emissions with respect to this average level by 3% for the year
2012 and by 5% beyond 2012. The CO2 emissions are depending directly on airlines
activity: the more activity, the more they have to pay. It is thus important to define
precisely a measure of the activity of the airlines. The indicator which we choose
as relevant is a weight and distance indicator. Indeed the CO2 emissions depends
proportionnaly on the quantity of fuel used. This quantity itself is sensitive to the
distance covered together with the weight carried. Therefore the relevant measure
is expressed in tons times kilometers. Let us define Wi as the activity of airline
i expressed in tons.km (one passenger with his luggage stands for 100kg) during a
given time period (typically one year). Airline i will thus receive a share of its yearly
activity RWi for free, where R is defined as follows:
R = rλcETS
r is the target of reduction of the regulator. It equals 0.97 ∗ 0.85 for the year
2For a detailed description of the legislation, see http://www.euractiv.com/en/climate-
change/aviation-emissions-trading/article-139728.
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2012 and 0.95 ∗ 0.85 beyond 2012.
λ is a constant which represents the tons of CO2 emitted by burning one liter of
fuel. It equals 2.52 ∗ 10−3tons of CO2/l.
We define cETS as the average consumption of fuel (expressed in liters of fuel per
tons.km) for the benchmark period 2004-2006.
R is thus the benchmark used by the regulator to set up the emissions it autho-
rizes for a given period. R is constant for all the airlines. Their emissions rights are
adapted with respect to their activity (Wi).
As a consequence, each airline i has to buy exactly λWi(ci − rcETS) allowances,
where ci corresponds to its average consumption of liters of fuel per tons kilometers
over the given period.3 The number of allowances asked to each airline relies on
the efficiency of the airline. Indeed, it is not only relying on the activity of the
airlines, which would have pushed airlines to increase their activity. The allocation
also depends on the distance between the average fuel consumption of the airline
and the benchmark chosen by the ETS, which is calculated over all the airlines for
the period 2004-2006. If airline i is more efficient than the benchmark, which means
that its fuel consumption is lower than the average consumption, airline i receives
allowances which will be sold on the market. On the contrary, if the airline fuel
consumption level is higher than the benchmark, airline i has to buy allowances.
At this stage, the number of allowances depends also on the global activity of the
airline, which creates a leverage effect. The cost of the emissions of an inefficient
airline which operates a lot will be very high. These costs will result in adjustments
for airlines in terms of technical progress or different strategies. Indeed, the renewal
of the fleet, the modernization of the equipment, the optimization of the planes’
trajectories, as well as the reorganization of the network, the reallocation of the
planes are the different actions an airline can take.
3.2 Stylised Facts
Once the system of regulation described, the first question which seems interesting
is the evaluation of the cost of this regulation. Indeed, the airlines will go from a
situation in which they were not paying for their pollution to a situation in which
they will have to pay for their emissions if not sufficiently efficient. This will nec-
essarily modify the market organization, adding costs that will be probably passed
3The average consumption of fuel is computed as follows, for airline i, which operates J routes
ci =
conso of fuel for all J routes∑
j Wij
, with j = 1, ..., J .
Malavolti and Podesta 9
on to consumers. In this section, we aim at giving a first evaluation of the cost or
benefit of the ETS regulation for some of the airlines for which we have the CO2
emissions for 2008 (source: carbon disclosure project).
Airlines performance
Airlines RTK000 (2008) Emissions2008 (tons) Fuel cons.(l) cavg (l/RTK)
Easyjet 4012513 4307000 1709126984 0.4259
Air France-KLM 29284393 27506144 10915136508 0.3727
British Airways 15228809 16840627 6682788492 0.4388
Iberia 5910594 5839469 2317249603 0.3920
The first column concerns the Revenue Ton Kilometers which stands for the total
carried mass (passengers and luggage, cargo and freight) on the network of a given
airline. This variable represents the activity of the airline since the fuel consumption
which explains the CO2 emissions is highly related to the weight carried over the
network. These figures come from the ENAC database. The RTK include the whole
network for a given carrier. However some of the airlines have part of their network
outside the perimeter of the regulation. This is for instance the case of BA or AF-
KLM. The figures are probably too high (and thus the cost or benefit probably
too optimistic), since the emissions are considered for Europe. We are nevertheless
not able to obtain exactly the figures corresponding to the relevant area of the
ETS. From the figures on the emissions, we can derive the fuel consumption for the
current year (2008). The (technical) coefficient used is denoted λ which value is
2.52 × 10−3 tons of CO2/liter. The average consumption of fuel cavg expressed in
l/tons× km is then easy to compute. The average consumption is used to compare
to the EU benchmark in order to determine whether the regulation is a cost or a
benefit. If cavg is lower than cETS, the airline will receive allowances to be sold on
the market. Its profits will be higher due to its efficiency with respect to the other
airlines.
Exogeneous data
cETS (l/RTK) 0.4724
benchmark = 85% × 95%cETS 0.3814
λ (TC02/L) 0.00252
CO2 price pa e13
The benchmark of the European Commission is not available yet. We decided
to rely on Airbus analysis of the fuel consumption for the year 2007, i.e. cETS =
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0.4724l/RTK. The price of the allowances chosen is the average one for 2009, i.e.
13e. This price is relatively low, due to the worldwide recession for 2008-2009 and
a slowdown in the demand, which relax constraints in the energy market. The entry
of the airlines on the market for allowances together with an expected economic
upturn suggest to interpret our result as a lower bound for the costs/benefits for
airlines.
Extra consumption for airlines
Airlines Efficiency measure (%) Cost per pass km Total cost in e
Easyjet 0.0445 (+12%) 0.015 5850244
Air France-KLM -0.0087 (-2.3%) -0.00285 -8346052
British Airways 0.0574 (+15%) 0.0188 28630161
Iberia 0.0106 (+2.8%) 0.0035 2052489
In the first column, we define an efficiency measure based on the distance between
the average fuel consumption and the benchmark. We then can estimate the total
cost (or benefit) of the regulation by multiplying by the price of allowances. We add
a column to measure the cost with respect to one passenger km carried, considering
that the whole activity (RTK) are explained by passengers carriage.4
AF-KLM is the only airline to have an average consumption just below the
benchmark. It will thus receive more free allowances than needed to cover its emis-
sions and will be able to sell them on the market. With an allowance price of 13e, it
will receive 8.3 Million euros from the sale. However, we have considered the whole
activity of AF-KLM (world wide) which is higher than the one for the european
market. For instance, if we make the assumption that the RTK for Europe repre-
sents 90% of the total RTK, the difference between the average consumption and
the ETS benchmark would amount +0.033l/tkm, which means a cost instead of a
benefit of 28,27 Million euros. This remark suggests the importance of the reliability
and precision of the RTK figures together with the CO2 emissions. This suggests
as well that an economic model focusing on the exact modelling of the ETS and
activity of the airlines would help explaining the driving forces at play.
Easyjet and British Airways are poorly efficient and will have to pay for this lack
of efficiency. The amount is very important for BA since its activity is very much
higher with respect to Easyjet. It represents for instance 2.7% of the total revenue
4One passenger amounts 100kg.
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of BA.5 Iberia is close to the ETS benchmark, even though a little above, which
means that it will have to pay for allowances.
If we make the assumption that the average length of a flight is 1000km for
Easyjet, the additional cost for this trip is thus 15e, which is quite important. For
BA, taking a 6000km trip would add 113e to the operating costs, which is very
important. For Iberia, taking the same distance would lead to an additional cost of
21e, which is far less. This discrepancy is problematic since it will create among the
airlines very important competitiveness problems. For an economist point of view,
it is very interesting to find the reasons of why there so many differences among the
carriers. However, what remains is that the truthfulness of the figures has to be
ensured because the impacts are very substantial.
In order to make further comparisons, we compute the same tables using the
figures from RDC report6 for the CO2 emissions of 2009 (exactly from march 2009
to march 2010). These figures are an approximation realized by RDC according
to the network, the fleet, the number of flights... Our results are presented in the
following table:
5We can not easily compare with operating results since they are negative in 2009.
6European Emission Report. Quarter 1-2010 in RDC Aviation.
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Airlines performance
Airlines RTK000 (2009) Emi.2008 (tons) Emi. 2009, tons (ev.) Fuel cons.(l) cavg (l/RTK)
Easyjet 3722220 4307000 7753817 (80%) 3076911508 0.8266
AF-KLM 28770277 27506144 26407231 (-4%) 10479059921 0.3642
BA 14520041 16840627 18645484 (11%) 7399001587 0.5096
Iberia 5481678 5839469 8768755 (48%) 3479664682 0.6348
Lufthansa 21313185 na 19093956 7576966667 0.3555
Before interpreting this table, two remarks have to be made: at first, the emis-
sions of Easyjet are very different in 2009. The evolutions of carbon emissions
between 2008 and 2009 are given in the third column with the variable ev. We
observe an increase of 80%, which cannot be explained neither by technical rea-
sons, nor economical reasons. This figure has thus to be taken into account with
much caution, especially because it will translate into huge costs. The same remark
can be made in a lower range however, to the figure concerning Iberia. There is a
difference of 48% between the emissions of CO2 in 2008 and 2009, with no reason
apparently. The data on the CO2 emissions are not easy to obtain and what airlines
have declared does not seem to correspond to what RDC model has computed. For
instance, Easyjet seems to be poorly efficient in 2009 with respect to 2008. Nothing
can explain this change: its fleet is very young, its network has not changed and its
load factor is high.
Extra consumption for airlines
Airlines Efficiency measure (%) Cost per ton km Total cost in e
Easyjet 0.4452 (+117%) 0.01458 54269968
Air France-KLM -0.0172 (-4.5%) -0.000562 -16168896
British Airways 0.1282 (+34%) 0.0042 60984172
Iberia 0.2534 (+66%) 0.0083 45505514
Lufthansa -0.0259 (-7%) 0.00085 -18116207
AF-KLM and Lufthansa are pretty efficient and receive allowances. However the
area of the activity considered (RTK) are overestimated because it includes other
traffic than simply european traffic. BA and Iberia are less efficient apparently, even
though we are not able to explain why. The recent merger between the two carriers
and the restructuration will probably help improving these figures.
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The diversity of the figures according to the years considered so as the different
sources suggest that a deeper analysis is needed. Building an economic model in
which different levers are present will help to identify the problem and the solutions
adopted by airlines.
3.3 The Cost Function
The regulation of the CO2 emissions means additional costs for airlines. These costs
are related to their activity because of the regulation itself and because the regulation
is associated to their fuel consumption. Hence, the relevant costs to be taken into
account are the variable costs. There are several variable costs to be considered like
labour costs, fuel costs, maintenance... depending on the time horizon considered
(annual or infra-annual). One important element of these last years is the fuel
consumption cost. Indeed, it has increased from 10% in 1994 of the total operating
costs to 33% in 2008.7 The air transport sector is also well known for the importance
of its fixed costs, like the investment in planes, like administrative costs (to develop
a network) or marketing costs. The fixed costs occur in the decision of launching
an activity or entering a new market. Once engaged, what matters to determine
firms strategies are the variable costs. In our economic model we will consider
only variable costs and analyze the impact of the regulation on the determination
of airlines activity: will they carry more or less passengers? according to which
strategies? how will they modify their network?
The total costs function of the economic model is composed of three parts: the
fixed costs, the variable costs concerning the fuel consumption and the variable costs
due to the regulation. Let us define:
TCi(qi, di) = FCi + CF,i(qi, di) +Xi(qi, di),
where FCi represents the fixed costs, CF,i(qi, di) is the total fuel cost of airline i and
Xi(qi, di) is the emissions cost of airline i. The activity of the airline is a combination
of the tons carried, denoted qi and the expanse of the network, denoted di for airline
i.
At first, fixed costs are normalized to zero for each airline because we consider the
situation of an airline which has its own network. Fixed costs will be reintroduced to
consider the decision to extend a network or even maintain a given route afterwards.
7Source: AEA and EIA forecasts.
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The economic model aims to show how the current activity of airlines is impacted
by the new regulation.
As we focus on the regulation and its financial impact, we restrict our attention
to the sole variable costs which are directly related to the regulation itself, i.e.
the fuel costs. The fuel costs are depending on the price of the fuel denoted pF
which is given on the crude oil spot market. It increased continuously since 1994 to
2008 and now is more stable, due to the world recession. Nonetheless this price is
structurally going to raise again because of non-renewable resources and increasing
world demand, putting pressure on airlines for a better use of the kerozen. The other
two parameters which determine the fuel costs, are the expanse of the network which
expressed as a distance variable denoted di, and the activity on a network measured
by the number of passengers carried expressed in tons, qi.
8 Over a network, the
fuel consumption is not homogeneous. Indeed, for a given route, the take-off is the
phase of time which consumes more fuel. Differences also exist with respect to the
distance of a given route: a long haul flight uses less fuel than a short haul flight
per ton km. One reason is technical: as the take-off phase consumes more, it can
be less amortized if the flight is short. Moreover, on a long haul flight, it is easier to
optimize the fuel consumption as the cruise phase is longer. We have chosen to focus
on the problem of capacity. Indeed, the airline supply on a given network is not
fully adjustable because of the given capacity of aircraft. For instance if an airline
owns 2 planes of equal capacity, let say 100 passengers for each, if the demand is 90
then only one plane is needed and the load factor is 90%. However if demand is 110,
then the airline has to put one other plane and the load factor decreases drastically
(110/200=55%). This has to be taken into account in the costs and especially in the
fuel costs since there is a certain amount of fuel to be carried to fly with a zero mass
(when the plane is empty) and the marginal cost of carrying one more passenger is
also increasing since more power is needed to carry a higher mass. We thus choose
the following fonctionnal form to represent the cost function:
CF,i(qi, di) = kCfuel,i(
qi
k
, di),
where qi is the activity of airline i (in tons carried), and k is an integer, di is the scope
of the network. This function is defined for all (k− 1)qp < q ≤ kqp, where qp stands
for the maximum seats offered for one plane (we assume that the fleet is composed
of homogeneous planes of equal maximum capacity measured in tons). The total
fuel cost is thus a piecewise function, increasing in qi. The fuel cost function is also
8A passenger with his luggage amounts 100kg.
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increasing with the km covered di. Besides we define:
Cfuel,i(qi, di) = C0(di)(1 + a)
qi
where C0(di) represents the minimum cost to be supported if one plane is used.
It corresponds to the consumption cost for the route with all the carried staff and
cargo but without passenger, on a given distance di. a is an efficiency measure of
the aircraft fuel consumption. It corresponds to the fuel consumed for one passenger
added in the plane. a is assumed to be small and can be checked empirically. We
assume besides that the whole influence of parameter di is captured in C0 and will
use several values of this parameter to calibrate the model. For sake of simplicity,
we use a Taylor series development and will use the following functionnal form9:
Cfuel,i(qi, di) = pFF0(di)(1 + aqi +
a2q2i
2
).
For instance, if the plane (with a capacity of 270 seats) is such that the minimum
quantity of fuel needed to travel is F0 = 68000l, knowing that the average fuel price
for 2009 is pF = 0.4e/l, and taking the overconsumption due to one additional
passenger to be equal to a = 0.0055.
50 100 150 200
q
50 000
100 000
150 000
200 000
250 000
cost
X(qi, di) allows to take into account the cost due to the regulation of the ETS
in aviation. This function is built in order to measure the additional cost incurred
by the regulation. This cost depends on the activity and on the fuel consumption.
It is in fact a measure of the distance between the emissions of the airline on the
route expressed as a function of the fuel consumption and the emissions tolerated
by the regulator, which we introduced in the previous section. The average fuel
9For a detailed analysis, see appendix 1.
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consumption of airline i, for a given network, is thus ci =
CF (qi,di)
diqipF
and the regulation
cost can thus be defined as follows:
X(qi, di) = pa(
λCF (qi, di)
pF
−Rqidi),
where pa is the price of an allowance in the market. Airlines are price taker, they
do not have any influence on it. pF is the price of the fuel, given on the market, R
equals λrcETS as defined in the previous section. X(.) can be positive or negative
depending on whether the airline has a fuel consumption respectively above or below
the benchmark. If the spot price of the emission rights pa is higher, the costs of
the regulation becomes more important if the airline has to buy rights. The airlines
have thus an interest in forecasting properly the price of the allowances. The two
instruments of the regulator to set a certain level of R are the target coefficient, r
which is supposed to decrease over the years and the benchmark evaluation of the
fuel consumption of airlines. If the price of the fuel pF is higher, then the X(.)
function is less likely to be positive. Indeed, a low fuel price relaxes the constraint
of being more efficient in using fuel. If the fuel costs are higher, then the costs of
the regulation are also higher. It means that a less efficient firm will support higher
costs for the regualtion of its emissions. Eventually, if the activity of the airline
increases, then the fuel costs increase but the free allowances as well. There is a
trade-off between increase of the fuel cost and free allowances, and the problem for
the airlines is if the fuel costs increase at a higher rate than the activity.
4 Equilibrium
We first analyse a situation in which airlines are competing a` la Bertrand on a given
city pair. This means that parameter d is exogenously given. Firms are then price
takers and their goods are perfect substitutes for consumers. The maximization
program is thus
MaxΠ(q)
{q}
= pq − TC(q)
s.t. TC(q) = FC + CF (q) +X(q)
The first order conditions give
p =
δCF (q)
δq
+
δX(q)
δq
The airlines equalize what selling one ticket (or pricing one additional ton carried)
yields to what it costs at the margin, i.e. the supplementary fuel consumption needed
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to carry this additional passenger (or ton) plus the additional regulation cost (if the
carrier is less efficient than the average) or minus the benefit (if the carrier is more
efficient than the average). Taking into account the definition of function X(.), the
expression writes:
p = (1 +
pa
pF
λ)
δCF (q)
δq
−R
This equation corresponds to the supply of each (identical) airline. The demand is
assumed to be linear10:
p = A−Bq,
where A and B are positive. A corresponds to the willingness to pay of consumers.
Parameter A(d) corresponds to the maximum price consumers want to pay for a
given network (it can be not only an origin-destination but an aggregate network).
It stands for their willingness to pay and is a representation of their preferences.
This maximum price is increasing with the scope of the network. We do have
typically very few information on the value of this parameter. Some airlines run
surveys in order to learn about this value. However the information is quite difficult
to estimate. B is a measure of the sensitivity of the variation of the price to a
variation of the quantity. It is a very important parameter for the airline because
while choosing a quantity to supply (or equally a price to fix), B is a measure of
what reduction in the price is needed to attract one more passenger. We make the
assumption that demand is influenced by the distance parameter through A and
consider that the consumer’s reaction to a modification of the price is not infuenced
directly by the destination chosen. More precisely, it means that the willingness to
pay for a trip from Paris to San Francisco is assumed to be higher than the one for
a Paris-Madrid. However, the sensitivity to the price is kept constant.
The equilibrium quantity is then11
qPC =
k(A− aF0(pF + pAλ) + cETSdpArλ))
(Bk + a2F0pF + a2F0pAλ)
.
The quantity at the equilibrium depends on different sets of parameters. The first
set of parameters includes technical variables, like k, F0 and a. These parameters are
linked to the technical efficiency in using fuel and capacity of the airline. Hence, they
10The demand is linear to make the model more tractable but results are robust to a log-linear
shape of the demand.
11The second order condition is satisfied by the assumption made on the cost function: increasing
at an increasing rate.
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allow to take into account the technical progress that airlines may incorporate into
their production process. For instance when an airline decides to renew a plane,
both coefficient F0 and a are modified to take into account a more efficient fuel
consumption. Parameter k changes to take into account both the change in capacity
and the induced modification of the load factor. The regulation levers are the price
of an allowance pa, the average consumption cETS used as benchmark and the target
r. A strict regulation will be for instance a higher price of allowances, induced by
a lower quantity of emissions rights decided by the European Commission. It also
corresponds to a lower cap set r. Even though the regulator cannot play with all
the instruments at the same horizon, it is still interesting to analyze the impact of
a variation of the different parameters. Indeed, r is fixed till 2020 by the law and
cETS is computed according to the past activity of airlines. However, the price of
allowances pa can be decided on a year basis. Finally, parameters A and B influence
the demand and therefore the choice of equilibrium. For instance a positive demand
shock would translate into a higherA (maximum of demand). ParameterB measures
the sensitivity to a variation of the quantity of the variation of the price. The more
sensitive the consumers’ demand, the lower the ability of the airline to set a higher
price at equilibrium.
If the airline chooses a more efficient plane with a lower F0, the number of
passengers carried at the equilibrium is higher. More activity is reached due to a
better use of fuel. Coefficient a plays in the same direction as well: a lower a means
a higher efficiency which enables the airline to carry more passengers. When the
capacity of the plane k is increased, the quantity is increased at the equilibrium
to take into account the cost of a having a ”bad” load factor. A more stringent
regulation resulting in an increase of the price of allowances pa leads to a lower
activity for the airline. If the average fuel consumption cETS decreases, the quantity
decreases as well at the equilibrium. The effect of the target r plays in the same
direction: if the regulator decides to strengthen the regulation (lower r), then the
impact on the quantity is negative and less passengers are carried at the equilibrium.
The price of the fuel has the same impact in our model than the price of an allowance:
the higher the fuel price, the less the quantity. It is important to note that in our
model, a partial taxation of the fuel price would have the same kind of effect than the
ETS system. If demand increases, for example with a higher A, then the quantity at
the equilibrium increases. If demand is less sensitive to the price, the airline is then
able to set a higher price for the same quantity or to increase the quantity at the
same price. Finally, d stands for the distance of the destination considered or more
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generally the scope of the network of a given airline. Parameter d has an influence
on the choice of parameter F0 because every type of plane will not be able to operate
every destination. Without regulation, the airline programme is the following:
MaxΠ(q)
{q}
= pq − TC(q)
s.t. TC(q) = FC + CF (q)
The solution of this programme offers an interesting benchmark to evaluate formally
the impact of the regulation on the activity. After computation, the solution is:
qPCN =
k(A− aF0pF )
(Bk + a2F0pF )
.
Proposition 1 The regulation can have a positive impact on the activity of the
airlines. The effect depends on the parameters.
Proof. We compute the difference between the quantities with regulation and
without regulation. This difference is
qPCN − qPC = kpaλ(aBF0k −BcETSdkr + a
2F0(A− cETSdpF r))
(Bk + a2F0pF )(Bk + a2F0(pF + paλ))
The denominator is always positive, for all acceptable values of the parameters, thus
the sign depends only on
(aBF0k −BcETSdkr + a2F0(A− cETSdpF r)).
Note that this expression is not depending on the price of the allowances. On the
contrary, it depends on the price of the fuel which has a negative impact on the
difference. Indeed, an increase of the price of the fuel has more influence on the
quantity without the regulation, it decreases faster. The technical parameters (a
and F0) are more likely to have a negative impact: if the plane chosen is less efficient
(higher a and or F0) then the difference is positive. Finally, if the regulation is less
strict (higher benchmark cETS and or higher target r) the difference is more likely to
be negative, since the quantity with regulation increases, while the other quantity
is not impacted. We cannot say much more since there are too many parameters
in the model. To go further we have to specify more and explore the relationship
between these parameters. This is what we do in the following section.
Whether to know if the quantity of equilibrium is lower in case of regulation is not
fully trivial. It is not clear whether this quantity is lower or higher to the quantity
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with regulation since the ETS can be either a cost or a benefit for the airlines.
The regulation has been set in order to limit the CO2 emissions, which leads, if no
technical progress is incorporated or simply available, to a direct decrease in the
activity of the airlines. This result is thus all the more counterintuitive. However,
it is due to the design of the regulation, which induces airlines to increase their
activity in order to cover the cost of the regulation. Finally, results depend on the
parameters values and we take several examples to illustrate the situation. They
are presented in the following section.
5 Scenarii
The first parameters we set are the regulation, the price of the allowances and the
price of the fuel.
Exogeneous data
cETS (l/RTK) 0.4724
r = 85% × 95% 0.8075
λ (tC02/L) 0.00252
CO2 price pa e13
Fuel price pF e0.4/l
The other parameters we have described (technical, demand) are not completely
independent of the distance parameter which is considered as exogenous in this
model. Indeed, on a long haul trip, the plane chosen will have different technical
characteristics (F0 and a) than on a short haul. The plane is typically larger when
the distance is higher, which goes with a higher ’fixed’ consumption of fuel i.e. with
a zero load factor (higher F0) and with a lower marginal consumption of fuel (lower
a). For the moment, we cannot give a functionnal form to model the influence
of the distance on the technical characteristics. We thus chose to distinguish two
cases: a long haul trip, with a given distance and evaluate for what pair of technical
parameters (a, F0) the quantity with regulation is higher. Moreover, the demand
is also influenced by the distance because the willingness to pay for a long trip will
be higher than for a short trip. For this reason, we decide to examine two opposite
cases: the first situation corresponds to a long haul flight, the second to a rather
short haul flight.
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5.1 Long haul scenario: Paris-San Francisco example
The distance between Paris and San Francisco is 9000km, thus we set d = 9000. The
demand function is defined for a one way trip. It is the residual demand, given all
the other costs especially variable costs (cabin crew, maintenance, catering...), thus
the maximum demand is lower than the one addressed to the company12. We chose
to set A = 8000k. Parameter k intervenes since the demand is defined by plane. k
represents the number of planes used at the equilibrium to carry the optimal number
of passengers and cargo, the maximum demand has thus to be multiplied by k to
be homogenous. For simplicity, we set k = 1.
We chose to take two values for the sensitivity of the demand to the price. We
consider first a demand which is rather inelastic, i.e. B1 = 0.8. We then consider a
rather elastic demand B2 = 1.2.
Lemma 1 The regulation leads to more activity when the airlines use efficient air-
plane. For instance, for an elastic demand, B2 = 1.2, the equation gives
qPCN − qPC ≥ 0
⇔ F0 ≥ 2746.53
0.8a+ 6626.73a2
The following figure illustrates this situation. Results are robust to the assumption
of inelastic demand.
0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010
a
20 000
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60 000
80 000
100 000
120 000
140 000
F0
12Our simulations are however robust to a large range of maximum demand and elasticity. We
tried to make the examples as realistic as possible though. The simulations files are available upon
request.
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For example, if the airlines use a A340 to operate the route Paris-San Francisco,
the technical characteristics are: (F0 = 68000, a = 0.0055). Then the difference is
positive: the airlines reduce their activity due to the regulation.
5.2 Short haul scenario: Paris-Madrid example
Let us now set d = 1300. The corresponding maximum demand is lower than for
the long haul trip, around e500 per ton km, thus A = 500k. For simplicity, we
present only the case for which k = 1. Both situations, elastic demand and inelastic
demand are analyzed, but we present the results for an elastic demand, since results
are consistent with an inelastic demand.
Lemma 2 The regulation leads to more activity when the airlines use efficient air-
plane. For instance, for an elastic demand, B2 = 1.2, the equation gives
qPCN − qPC ≥ 0
⇔ F0 ≥ 396.722
0.8a+ 301.639a2
The following figure illustrates this situation.
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6 The duopoly situation
In this section, we study a duopoly situation where two airlines compete on a given
network. We consider that distance is exogeneous, however in the sequel we will
remove this assumption. Now consumers have the choice among different airlines.
Each consumer can choose between two options of consumption according to their
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preferences. The preferences of consumers depend of intrinsic characteristics. Both
airlines offer a journey, and consumers choose either one firm or another one de-
pending of their preferences.
In the economic literature, there exist two types of differentiation.13 The goods
can be horizontally differentiated or vertically differentiated. The horizontal differ-
entiation means that consumers have differences of opinion, even if prices are the
same, some consumers prefer buying from firm 1 and some from firm 2. Whereas,
vertical differentiation expresses that goods have different quality, if prices are the
same then every consumer prefers buying from the higher quality firm and latter
holds onto some consumers even if its price is higher than its competitors. For
instance, horizontal differentiation corresponds to the situation when an identical
good is sold in different areas of a town (but at the same price), all consumers lo-
cated in one area prefer to buy in their own area whereas to buy from other retailers.
The horizontal differentiation is associated to spatial models introduced by Hotelling
in 1929. The vertical differentiation corresponds to the case where there are some
variants of a good, for instance high quality variants (”luxury”) and standard qual-
ity. Sold at a same price, all consumers prefer to buy the luxury variant. The
competition between firms when goods are horizontally or vertically differentiated
is different and entails specific consequences in each case.14
In our model we consider that both airlines offer an horizontally differentiated
good, and consumers purchase either from firm i or firm j, with i, j = 1, 2. Each
consumer consumes one unit of one variant between the set of possible outcomes.
The introduction of competition allows us to better understand the reality of
aviation sector.
• Expliquer la demande: comment on mode´lise la concurrence
We still consider that consumers’ demand is linear and given by:
Pi(qi, d) = A(d)−Bqi + Eqj
where i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j. As in the previous section, Pi(qi, d) is the consumers’
demand for firm i. The parameter A(d) corresponds to the maximum consumers’
willingness to pay for a given network. Quantities qi and qj are imperfectly substi-
tutes for consumers and the relative degree of substitutability is given by B/E.
13This distinction is given by Lancaster (1966).
14For more details, see Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1983).
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6.1 Duopoly with regulation
The airlines’ costs are the same than previously and symmetric for each firm. The
profit function is the same for both firms, therefore we can write the maximisation
program of an airline i as:
MaxΠi(qi, d)
{qi,qj}
= Pi(qi, d)qi − TCi(qi, d)
s.t.
{
Pi(qi, d) = A(d)−Bqi + Eqj
TCi(qi, d) = FCi + CFi(qi, d) +X(qi, d)
with i, j = 1, 2. The first-order condition is the same than in monopoly context but
now demand takes into account competition:
P
′
i (qi, d) + Pi(qi, d) = C
′
Fi
(qi, d) +X
′
(qi, d)
The maximization program gives us the quantity for airline i (and it is symmetric
for airline j):
q∗i =
k (A+ parλcETSd− F0(d)a(pF + paλ))
k(2B − E) + F0(d)a2(pF + paλ)
As in the perfect competition situation, this quantity depends on the different sets
of parameters. There are technical variables: k, F0(d) and a which refer directly to
fuel consumption and capacity of the airline. For the regulation constraints, pa is
the price of allowances fixed by the market, cETS is the average consumption and
r the target decided by european authorities. Finally, parameters A(d), B and E
influence the demand and the level of equilibrium. The equilibrium profit is given
in the appendix.
We can compare the sum of quantities in duopoly with the monopolist quantity:
(
2∑
i=1
q∗i−qE) =
k (A+ pa rλcETSd− F0(d)a(pF + paλ)) (k(2B + E) + F0(d)a2(pF + pa λ ))
(k(2B − E) + F0(d)a2(pF + pa λ)) (2Bk + F0(d)a2(pF + pa λ))
The total quantity in duopoly is more important than the one in monopoly
situation. As the monopoly is a price maker, it restricts its quantity to charge a
higher price. The competition entails higher quantities and this quantity effect leads
to decrease prices.
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6.2 Duopoly without regulation
When we consider the case where European Comission do not regulate aviation
sector, we can rewrite the maximization program without cost of regulation:
MaxΠi(qi, d)
{qi,qj}
= Pi(qi, d)qi − TCi(qi, d)
s.t.
{
Pi(qi, d) = A(d)−Bqi + Eqj
TCi(qi, d) = FCi + CFi(qi, d)
At the equilibrium, quantity is given by:
q0i =
k (A− pFF0(d)a)
k(2B − E) + pF F0(d)a2
We can compare the situation with and without regulation to show its impact on
quantities:
(q∗i − q0i ) = −
kpaλ [k(2B − E)(F0(d)a− rcETS d) + F0(d)a2(A− rcETS dpF )]
(k(2B − E) + F0 a2(pF + pa λ) (k(2B − E) + pF F0(d)a2)
This difference depends on the sets of parameters defined previously. To be contin-
ued...
7 Conclusion
At the beginning of the application, the EU will create an ex-ante benchmark ”so
as to ensure that allocation takes place in a manner that provides incentives for
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and energy efficient techniques, by taking
account of the most efficient techniques, substitutes, alternative production processes,
efficient energy recovery of waste gases, use of biomass and capture and storage of
CO2, where such facilities are available, and shall not provide incentives to increase
emissions” [source: European Directive]. Our economic analysis shows that the
introduction of the ETS system tends to increase the airlines activity for the more
efficient aircraft: more passengers are carried at the equilibrium. This result is
due to the particular shape of the ETS cost function X, which we have modelled
as closely as possible from the real system. Now, airlines cope with the necessity
to improve their load factor and their consumption per tonne.kilometer. However,
for all less efficient planes, the introduction of the regulation tends to decrease the
airlines’ activity and therefore to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions. For future
Malavolti and Podesta 26
research, we will endogenize the expanse of the network in a two-stage game since
this variable is very important in the definition of the parameters, especially the
technical ones.
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A Fuel cost function
We detail the fuel cost as a function of d, the distance of the route, q, the tons
carried and pF , the fuel price. The function CF (q, d, pF ) is defined as the fuel cost
consumption for a given aircraft and a given route expressed in e. To design this
function, we need to define variables and functions C0(d, pF ), a, qp, which qualify
an aircraft characteristics and performances.
• C0(d, pF ) is the consumption cost for the route with all the carried staff and
stuff but without any passenger (with a load-factor equivalent to 0).
C0(d, pF ) = F0(d)× pF ,
where F0(d) is the fuel consumption for the route with all the carried staff
and stuff but without any passenger (with a load-factor equivalent to 0). This
function is a non-linear function of variable d, the distance covered. F0(d) is
expressed in liters so as C0(d).
• a is a parameter modeling the over-consumption due to an additional passenger
(marginal cost). We assume that a is constant.
• qp is a parameter modeling the aircraft capacity of passengers expressed in
tons.
Besides, we introduce Cfuel(q, d) which represents the fuel cost function of the
aircraft carrying q ∈ [0, qp]. We precise that we have Cfuel(q, d) = Ffuel(q, d) × pF
with Ffuel(q, d) the total fuel consumption.
With a given aircraft, one cannot carry more passengers than the initial capacity.
If q > qp, the airline needs to use more than one aircraft or to use several times the
same. If total demand is q and q > qp, the airline must use at least E[q/qp] + 1
aircraft to carry the passengers where E[q/qp] is the integer part of q/qp. We will
consider the airline uses exactly E[q/qp] + 1 aircraft, especially because of the fixed
costs, with the same load-factor equivalent to q
(E[q/qp]+1)qp
. We define Cfuel(q, d) as
follows:
Cfuel(q, d) = C0(d)(1 + a)
q,
with a > 0 and close to 015.
15See ENAC study for the fuel consumption in the air transport sector.
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When a passenger is added to the flight, the airline needs more fuel because of
two physical reasons. Firstly, more passengers means more on-board mass (100kg
per passenger), so that the aircraft mass increases and it needs more power to fly.
The airline has to take more fuel on board. Secondly, in aviation, we need to board
fuel to the propulsion needs. Indeed, because of the fuel mass increases, the aircraft
consumes fuel to transport fuel. These two physical reasons illustrate the shape of
Cfuel(q, d). Moreover, parameter a is positive but close to 0. Indeed, the experience
shows that additional passenger makes the necessary mass-fuel to increase however
not tremendously because of the significant aircraft mass alone.16
The parameters which differentiate two aircraft with the same capacity are C0(d)
and a. C0(d) and a are given by the aircraft manufacturers and the fuel market.
Hence, an airline’s fuel cost results of two factors : the price of fuel and the fuel
efficiency. For sake of simplicity, the shape of Cfuel(q, d) is approximated using the
Taylor series, as a > 0 and close to 0, and with 0 < q ≤ qp:
(1 + a)q = 1 +
n∑
i=1
1
i!
(
i−1∏
j=0
((q − j))ai) + o(ai)
up to the second order, it is equivalent to:
(1 + a)q = 1 + aq +
a2q(q − 1)
2!
+ o(a2).
Thereby, the cost function writes for q ≤ qp:
Cfuel(q, d) = C0(d)(1 + a(1− a
2
)q +
a2
2
q2)
which we can simplify the expression (since a small and a ' a(1 − a
2
)). Therefore
we obtain:
Cfuel(q, d) = C0(d)(1 + aq +
a2q2
2
).
Let us define function CF (q, d) which is the total fuel consumption over a network.
CF (q, d) is actually a piecewise function since there exists a discontinuity in the
capacity of aircraft. When the airline needs to use an additional plane, it might not
be full and thus the cost is more than the double of the cost of one full plane. The
total fuel cost, ∀k > 0 and k integer number ∀q ∈ [(k − 1)qp, kqp], can be rewritten
as:
CF (q, d) = k × Cfuel( q
k
, d).
16Notice that in the model we consider a flight without wind and in the standard flight conditions.
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For example in the model, if q ∈ [qp, 2qp] thus CF (q, d) = 2 × Cfuel(q/2, d). Total
costs of engaging an additional plane (if not full) are increasing with the activity
and distance.
B Equilibrium quantity
B.1 Linear function
We compute the first and second-order conditions to find the optimum of the profit
function:
max
{q}
Π(q) = max
{q}
P (q, d)q − TC(q, d) = max
{q}
P (q, d)q − FC − CF (q, d)−X(q, d).
As CF (q) is a piecewise function equivalent to kCfuel(
q
k
, d) on the interval [(k −
1)qp, kqp] with k integer, we consider:
∃k ≥ 0 qE ∈ [(k − 1)qp, kqp].
The first order condition gives:
∂Π(q)
∂q
= A(d)− 2Bq − C0(d)k(a
k
+
a2q
k2
)(1 +
pa
pF
) +Rd = 0.
The second order condition is such that:
∂2Π(q)
∂q2
= −2B − a
2C0(d)
k
(1 +
pa
pF
) ≤ 0.
As pa
pF
≥ 0, a2 ≥ 0, C0(d) ≥ 0, k > 0, B > 0 then ∂2
∏
(q)
∂q2
< 0, which means that the
program is concave.
At the optimum, marginal revenue equals marginal cost, i.e. P (q, d)+qP ′(q, d) =
CF (q, d) with
A(d)− 2Bq = C0(d)k(a
k
+
a2q
2k
)(1 +
pa
pF
λ)−Rd.
At the optimum, when qE ∈ [(k − 1)qp, kqp] we have:
qE =
k(A(d) +Rd− aC0(d)(1 + papF λ))
2Bk + a2C0(d)(1 +
pa
pF
λ)
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When we introduce R = λcETSr, we have
qE =
k(A(d) + λcETSrd− aF0(d)(pF + paλ)
2Bk + a2F0(d)(pF + paλ)
The equilibrium quantity is thus qE when it is positive, which introduces a constraint
qE ≥ 0
⇒ A(d) + rλcETSd ≥ aF0(d)(pF + paλ)
This condition is fulfilled if the market is sufficiently wide (high A(d)) so that the
airline can have space to launch the activity. It corresponds for example to a suffi-
ciently large network (high d). If the condition is not satisfied, then the equilibrium
quantity is 0. The benchmark situation corresponds to the non regulation case in
which the airline maximizes its profit:
MaxΠ(q)
{q}
= P (q, d)q − TC(q, d)
s.t.
{
P (q, d) = A(d)−Bq
TC(q, d) = FC + CF (q, d)
The first order condition gives:
P ′(q, d)q + P (q, d) = C ′F (q, d)
which leads after simplifications to:
q0 =
k(A(d)− aF0(d)pF )
2Bk + a2F0(d)pF
,
where d is given.
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B.2 Duopoly
Equilibrium profit with regulation is given by:
Πi(qi, d) =
1
2
1
(k(2B − E) + F0(d)a2(pF + pa λ))2
+kF0(d)a
2((pF + pa λ)(A
2 + 2AparλcETSd) + pFp
2
ar
2λ2c2ETSd
2 + p3ar
2λ3c2ETSd
2)
−kF0(d)a3(2Ap2aλ2)
+kF 20 (d)a
3((pF + 2pa λ)(−2λparcETSdpF − 2ApF )− 2p3arλ3cETSd)
−kF 30 (d)a4((pF + pa λ)3pFpaλ+ p3F + p3aλ3)
+k2F0(d)a((pF + pa λ)(−4B(A+ λparcETSd)))
−k2F 20 (d)a2((pF + pa λ)2(6B − 4E))
+2k2B(λparcETSd (2A+ λparcETSd) + A
2)
−k3F0(d)((pF + pa λ)(8B2 + 2E2 − 8BE))
• Parametre important (2B-C) qui doit eˆtre positif: qu’est ce que c¸a
veut dire?
Equilibrium profit without regulation is the following:
ΠNi (qi, d) =
1
2
1
(k(2B − E) + pFF0(d)a2)
−2k3pFF0(d)(E(4B + E)) + 2k2p2FF 20 (d)a2(−3B + 2E)
−k(pFF0(d)a2(p2FF 20 (d)a2 + A2 − 2ApFF0(d)a))
+2k2AB(A− 2apFF0(d))
